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TAX COMPETITION, TAX ARBITRAGE, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 1

In the past ten years, I have argued repeatedly that a coherent
international tax regime exists, embodied in both the tax treaty
network and in domestic laws, and that it forms a significant part of
international law (both treaty-based and customary). The practical
implication is that countries are not free to adopt any international tax
rules they please, but rather operate in the context of the regime,
which changes in the same ways international law changes over time.
Thus, unilateral action is possible, but is also restricted, and countries
are generally reluctant to take unilateral actions that violate the basic
norms that underlie the regime. Those norms are the single tax
principle (i.e., that income should be taxed once- not more and not
less) and the benefits principle (i.e., that active business income
should be taxed primarily at source, and passive investment income
primarily at residence).

This thesis is quite controversial. Several prominent international tax
academics and practitioners in the US (e.g., Michael Graetz, David
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Rosenbloom, Julie Roin, Mitchell Kane) and elsewhere (e.g., Tsilly
Dagan) have advocated the view that there is no international tax
regime and that countries are free to adopt any tax rules they believe
further their own interests (Graetz, 2001; Rosenbloom, 2006, 2000;
Roin, 2002; Dagan, 2000; Kane, 2005). Other prominent tax
academics (e.g., Hugh Ault, Yariv Brauner, Paul McDaniel, Diane Ring,
Richard Vann) and practitioners (e.g., Luca dell'Anese, Shay Menuchin,
Philip West) have supported the view advocated above (dell'Anese,
2006; Ring 2005; Menuchin 2004; Ault, 2002; McDaniel, 2001; Vann,
2003; West, 1996). However, there is no coherent exposition of this
view in the academic or practical literature. This article is intended to
fill this gap, following up on previous articles in which I developed the
above thesis (e.g., Avi-Yonah, 1996, 1997, 2000).

The article is divided into four parts. Part 1 argues that an
international tax regime exists, embodied both in the tax treaty
network and in the domestic tax laws of the major trading nations.
Illustrations are provided from recent developments that show
countries like the US and Germany complying with basic norms of the
regime, such as non-discrimination. Part 2 argues that the
international tax regime is an important part of international law, as it
evolved in the 20th century. In particular, the article argues that parts
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of international tax law can be seen as customary international law
and therefore as binding even in the absence of treaties. An example
would be the arm’s length standard under transfer pricing. Part 3 of
the article explains the basic structure of the international tax regime
and its underlying norms, the single tax principle (income should be
taxed once, no more and no less) and the benefits principle (active
business income should be taxed primarily at source, passive
investment income primarily at residence). Part 3 further sets out the
normative rationale for these norms. Part 4 of the article then
discusses recent challenges to the international tax regime such as tax
competition and tax arbitrage, and argues that the reaction to these
challenges by the OECD, the WTO, the EU, and specific tax
administrations prove the existence of the international tax regime.

1. Is There an International Tax Regime? 2

The most important statement denying the existence of the
international tax regime was the 1998 Tillinghast Lecture delivered by
H. David Rosenbloom at the NYU law school (Rosenbloom, 2000).
Rosenbloom began his lecture by quoting from the legislative history
of the US dual consolidated loss rules a statement referring to an
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"international tax system." He then proceeded to deny the existence
of this system or regime ("that system appears to be imaginary"),
because in the real world, only the different tax laws of various
countries exist, and those laws vary greatly from each other.

Of course, this description is true as far as it goes, but is this the
whole truth? As Rosenbloom noted, in fact, there has been a
remarkable degree of convergence even in the purely domestic tax
laws of developed countries. Not only can tax lawyers talk to each
other across national boundaries and understand what each is saying
(the terminology is the same), but the need to face similar problems in
taxing income has led jurisdictions with different starting points to
reach quite similar results. For example, countries that started off with
global tax systems (i.e., tax “all income from whatever source derived”
in the same way) now have incorporated schedular elements (for
example, the capital loss and passive activity loss rules in the United
States), whereas countries with a schedular background (i.e., tax
different types of income differently) have largely adopted schedules
for "other income" that lead to a global tax base (for example, the
U.K.).
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Not surprisingly, this convergence is most advanced in international
tax matters, because in this case the tax laws of various jurisdictions
actually interact with each other, and one can document cases of
direct influence. For example, every developed country now tends to
tax currently passive income earned by its residents overseas (through
controlled foreign corporations and foreign investmeent funds (FIF)
rules, which were inspired by the U.S. example), and to exempt or
defer active business income. Thus, the distinction between countries
that assert worldwide taxing jurisdiction and those that only tax
territorially has lost much of its force. We will develop other examples
of such convergence in the course of the article.

The claim that an international tax regime exists, however, rests
mainly on the bilateral tax treaty network, which, as Rosenbloom
stated, is "a triumph of international law." The treaties are of course
remarkably similar (even to the order of the articles), being based on
the same OECD and UN models. In most countries, the treaties have a
higher status than domestic law, and thus constrain domestic tax
jurisdiction; and even in the United States, the treaties typically
override contrary domestic law. This means that in international tax
matters, countries typically are bound by treaty to behave in certain
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ways (for example, not tax a foreign seller who has no permanent
establishment), and cannot enact legislation to the contrary.

I would argue that the network of 2,000 or more bilateral tax
treaties that are largely similar in policy, and even in language,
constitutes an international tax regime, which has definable principles
that underlie it and are common to the treaties. These principles are
the single tax principle and the benefits principle, which will be
articulated further below. In brief, the single tax principle states that
income from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once
(that is, not more but also not less than once), at the rate determined
by the benefits principle. The benefits principle allocates the right to
tax active business income primarily to the source jurisdiction and the
right to tax passive investment income primarily to the residence
jurisdiction.

To those who doubt the existence of the international tax regime, let
me pose the following question: Suppose you were advising a
developing country or transition economy that wanted to adopt an
income tax for the first time. How free do you think you would be to
write the international tax rules for such a country in any way you
wanted, assuming that it wished to attract foreign investment? I would
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argue that the freedom of most countries to adopt international tax
rules is severely constrained, even before entering into any tax
treaties, by the need to adapt to generally accepted principles of
international taxation. Even if divergent rules have been adopted, the
process of integration into the world economy forces change. For
example, Mexico had to abandon its long tradition of applying formulas
in transfer pricing and adopt rules modeled after the OECD guidelines
in order to be able to join the OECD. South Korea similarly had to
change its broad interpretation of what constitutes a permanent
establishment under pressure from the OECD. And Bolivia had to
abandon its attempt to adopt a cash flow corporate tax because it was
ruled not creditable in the United States. Even the United States is not
immune to this type of pressure to conform, as can be seen if one
compares the 1993 proposed transfer pricing regulations under IRC
section 482, which led to an international uproar, with the final
regulations, which reflect the OECD guidelines.

Another illustration can be derived from recent developments in both
the US and Germany regarding the application of the principle of nondiscrimination, which is embodied in all the tax treaties, to thin
capitalization rules that are designed to prevent foreign taxpayers
from eliminating the corporate tax base through capitalizing domestic
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subsidiary corporations principally with debt. When the US first
adopted its thin capitalization rule in 1989, it carefully applied it both
to foreigners and to domestic tax exempts, so as not to appear to be
denying interest deductions only to foreigners. The US did this even
though thin capitalization rules are an accepted part of international
tax law and even though its constitutional law permits unilateral
overrides of tax treaties. The Germans adopted the same rule, but
when it was nevertheless struck down as discriminatory by the
European Court of Justice in 2002, they responded by applying thin
capitalization to all domestic as well as foreign taxpayers. Neither the
US nor the German actions are understandable in the absence of an
international tax regime embodying the principle of non-discrimination.

2. Is the International Tax Regime Part of International
Law? 3

Few would dispute that the network of bilateral tax treaties forms an
important part of international law. Thus, the key issue is whether
these treaties and the domestic tax laws of various jurisdictions can be
said to form an international tax regime that is part of customary
international law.

3
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Customary international law is law that “results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.” Rest. 3rd (For. Rel.) sec. 102(2). “International agreements
create law for states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of
customary international law when such agreements are intended for
adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.” Rest.
3rd (For. Rel.) sec. 102(3).

There clearly are international tax practices that are widely followed,
such as for example avoiding double taxation by granting an
exemption for foreign source income or a credit for foreign taxes.
Moreover, there are over 2,000 bilateral tax treaties in existence, and
they all follow one of two widely accepted models (the OECD and UN
model treaties), which themselves are quite similar to each other and
are “intended for adherence by states generally.” Is this enough to
create a customary international tax law?

In the following, I will briefly survey some examples that in my opinion
strengthen the view that the international tax regime rises to the level
of customary international law. As usual, the hard question is whether
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countries not only follow a rule, but do so out of a sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris).

a. Jurisdiction to Tax.

Can a country simply decide to tax non-residents that have no
connection to it on foreign source income? The answer is clearly no,
both from a practical perspective and, I would argue, from a
customary international law perspective. The fact that this rule is
followed from a sense of legal obligation is illustrated by the behavior
of the US in adopting the FPHC and CFC rules. In the case of
corporations controlled by US residents, the US does not tax those
corporations directly, but rather taxes the US resident shareholders on
imaginary (deemed) dividends distributed to the shareholders. This
deemed dividend rule was adopted precisely because the US felt bound
by a customary international law rule not to tax non-residents directly
on foreign source income, even though they are controlled by
residents. The US no longer feels bound by this rule, but that is
because enough other countries have adopted CFC legislation that
expands the definition of nationality that customary international law
has changed. The spread of CFC legislation from 1962 onward is a
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good example of how rapidly customary international law can in fact
change.

b. Non-discrimination.

The non-discrimination norm (i.e., that non-residents from a treaty
country should not be treated worse than residents) is embodied in all
tax treaties. But is it part of customary international law? The behavior
of the US in the earnings stripping episode described above suggests
that the US felt at the time that the non-discrimination norm was
binding even outside the treaty context. Otherwise, even if it did not
wish to override treaties, it could have applied a different rule to nontreaty country residents (as it did in the branch profits tax context
three years earlier). Thus, I would argue that the non-discrimination
norm may in fact be part of customary international law even in the
absence of a treaty.

c. The Arm’s Length Standard.

The standard applied in all tax treaties to the transfer pricing problem
of determining the proper allocation of profits between related entities
is the “arm’s length standard”, which means that transactions between
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related parties may be adjusted by the tax authorities to the terms
that would have been negotiated had the parties been unrelated to
each other. This standard has been the governing rule since the
1930s.

In the 1980s, the US realized that in many circumstances it is very
difficult to find comparable transactions between unrelated parties on
which to base the arm’s length determination. It therefore began the
process of revising the regulations that govern transfer pricing. This
culminated in 1995 with the adoption of two new methods, the
comparable profit method and profit split method, that rely much less
on finding comparables (and in the case of profit split sometimes
require no comparables at all).

What is remarkable about the process by which these regulations were
adopted is the US insistence throughout that what it was doing was
consistent with the arm’s length standard. It even initially called profit
split the “basic arm’s length return method.” But as I have pointed out
elsewhere, once you abandon the search for comparables, it is
meaningless to call a method “arm’s length”, because without
comparables nobody can know what unrelated parties would have
done (Avi-Yonah, 1995).
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Nevertheless, despite initial objections, the OECD ultimately came to
accept the gist of the new methods in its revised transfer pricing
guidelines, which were issued a short time after the new US
regulations and represent the widely followed consensus view of
transfer pricing. The new methods are thus accepted under the rubric
of “arm’s length”.

As Brian Leppard has suggested, the US insistence that it was
following the arm’s length standard indicates that it felt that the
standard is part of customary international law (Leppard, 1998). Such
a finding has important implications because the US states explicitly
follow a non-arm’s length method, formulary apportionment, which
has been twice upheld by the US Supreme Court. If the arm’s length
method is customary international law, these cases may have been
wrongly decided, as customary international law is part of federal law
and arguably preempts contrary state law.

d. Foreign Tax Credits vs. Deductions.

Many economists argue that countries should only give a deduction for
foreign taxes rather than a credit. However, countries generally grant
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either an exemption for foreign source income or a credit for foreign
taxes paid. Remarkably, in most cases (following the lead of the US)
this is done even in the absence of a treaty. It is likely that at this
point countries consider themselves in practice bound by the credit or
exemption norm, and a country would feel highly reluctant to switch to
a deduction method instead. Thus, arguably preventing double
taxation through a credit or exemption has become part of customary
international law.

e. Conclusion.

If customary international tax law exists, this has important
implications for the US and other countries. As Justice Gray wrote over
100 years ago in the Paquete Habana case, “[I]nternational law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this
purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations.” 175 US 677, 700 (1900). To the
extent legislation exists, it can in the US override customary
international law as well as treaties. But in the absence of treaties or
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legislation, resort can be had to customary international law; and I
would argue that it can also be used to ascertain the underlying
purposes of treaties.

To the extent that customary international tax law exists, this suggests
that it is a mistake to deny the existence of an international tax
system or regime. Admittedly, even if an international tax regime
exists, it does not follow what we should do about it- this has to be
investigated in each particular case. But we should not pretend that
there are no binding, widely accepted international tax norms that we
should flout only when significant national interests are at stake. This
view has important implications whenever differences between
countries’ domestic laws lead to the possibility of tax arbitrage, which
will be discussed further below.

3. The Structure of the International Tax Regime. 4

If an international tax regime exists, what does it look like? The
following sections will first define the two basic principles which in my
view underlie the international tax regime and why they are
normatively justified.

4
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a. Defining the Tax Base: The Single Tax Principle

International income taxation involves two basic questions: 1. What is
the appropriate level of taxation that should be levied on income from
cross-border transactions? 2. How are the resulting revenues to be
divided among taxing jurisdictions?

The answer to the first question is the Single Tax Principle: Income
from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once (that is,
neither more nor less than once). The Single Tax Principle thus
incorporates the traditional goal of avoiding double taxation, which
was the main motive for setting up the international tax regime in the
1920's and 1930's. Taxing cross- border income once also means,
however, that it should not be undertaxed or (at the extreme) be
subject to no tax at all.

The appropriate rate of tax for purposes of the Single Tax Principle is
determined by the second principle of international taxation, the
Benefits Principle. The Benefits Principle, discussed below, assigns the
primary right to tax active business income to source jurisdictions and
the primary right to tax passive income to residence jurisdictions.
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Therefore, the rate of tax for purposes of the Single Tax Principle is
generally the source rate for active business income and the residence
rate for passive (investment) income. When the primary jurisdiction
refrains from taxation, however, residual taxation by other (residence
or source) jurisdictions is possible, and may be necessary to prevent
undertaxation. Such residual taxation means that all income from
cross-border transactions, under the Single Tax Principle, should be
taxed at least at the source rate (which tends to be lower than the
residence rate), but at no more than the residence rate.

What is the normative basis for the Single Tax Principle? As an initial
matter, I assume that most countries would like to maintain both a
personal income tax and a corporate income tax. The reasons for
having both a personal income tax and a corporate income tax have
been discussed extensively elsewhere, and are not repeated here (see,
e.g., Avi-Yonah 2002, 2004).

For purposes of justifying the Single

Tax Principle, it is sufficient that most countries in fact maintain their
existing personal and corporate income taxes.

Given a preference for imposing both a personal and a corporate
income tax on domestically derived income of individuals and
corporations, it becomes relatively easy to establish why the Single
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Tax Principle is justified as a goal of the international tax regime, on
both theoretical and practical grounds. From a theoretical perspective,
if income derived from cross-border transactions is taxed more heavily
than domestic income, the added tax burden creates an inefficient
incentive to invest domestically. This proposition is widely accepted
and underlies the effort, which by now is about a century old, to
prevent or alleviate international multiple taxation.

The corollary also holds true: If income from cross-border
transactions is taxed less heavily than domestic income, this creates
an inefficient incentive to invest internationally rather than at home.
The deadweight loss from undertaxation is the same as that from
overtaxation.

In addition, there is also a strong equity argument against
undertaxation of cross-border income, which applies to income earned
by individuals. From an equity perspective, undertaxation of crossborder income violates both horizontal and vertical equity when
compared to higher tax rates imposed on domestic source income, and
in particular on domestic labor income. In this case, the argument that
equity violations tend to turn into efficiency issues does not hold,
because labor is less mobile than capital and wage earners typically do
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not have the ability to transform their domestic wages into foreign
source income.

On a practical level, the Single Tax Principle can be justified because
double taxation leads to tax rates that can be extremely high and tend
to stifle international investment. Zero taxation, on the other hand,
offers an opportunity to avoid domestic taxation by investing abroad,
and therefore threatens to erode the national tax base. T.S. Adams,
the architect of the foreign tax credit and a major influence in shaping
the international tax regime, recognized both of these propositions in
the 1920's. In justifying the foreign tax credit, Adams wrote "the state
which with a fine regard for the rights of the taxpayer takes pains to
relieve double taxation, may fairly take measures to ensure that the
person or property pays at least one tax." Contrary to an exemption
system, Adams' credit operated to eliminate double taxation by both
source and residence jurisdictions, but preserved residual residencebased jurisdiction to enforce the Single Tax Principle (Graetz and
O’Hear, 1997).

The practical justification for the Single Tax Principle can be seen
most easily if one imagines a world with only two countries, A and B,
and only two companies, X (a resident of A) and Y (a resident of B). If
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both A and B tax the foreign source income of their residents and
domestic source income of foreigners, and neither gives relief from
double taxation, then both X and Y would minimize their taxes by only
deriving domestic source income (since any foreign tax would by
definition be an added burden). The result would be adequate
revenues collected by both A and B, but no cross-border trade or
investment.

On the other hand, suppose both A and B exempted from tax both
foreign source income and domestic source income of foreigners (a not
inconceivable proposition in many developing countries, which tax
residents territorially and grant tax holidays to foreign investors). In
that case, the way for both X and Y to minimize their taxes would be
to derive their entire income from cross-border transactions. The
result would be adequate cross-border trade, but no revenues for A or
B. In a world in which international trade and investment are
important, but taxes (unlike tariffs) cannot be reduced to zero, the
Single Tax Principle is the best option.

b. Dividing the Tax Base: The Benefits Principle

20
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Having defined one goal of the international tax regime as taxing
cross-border income once, the next question is how to divide that base
among the various jurisdictions laying claim to it. The Benefits
Principle states that the residence jurisdiction has the primary right to
tax passive (investment) income, while the source jurisdiction has the
primary right to tax active (business) income. As explained above, this
division also determines the appropriate rate of tax for purposes of the
Single Tax Principle.

This distinction, which stems from the work of the League of Nations
in the 1920s, also can be justified on both theoretical and pragmatic
grounds. On a theoretical level, the Benefits Principle makes sense
because it is primarily individuals who earn investment income,
whereas it is primarily corporations that earn business income. In the
case of individuals, residence-based taxation makes sense. First,
residence is relatively easy to define in the case of individuals. Second,
because most individuals are part of only one society, distributive
concerns can be addressed most effectively in the country of
residence. Third, residence overlaps with political allegiance, and in
democratic countries, residence taxation is a proxy for taxation with
representation.

21
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In the case of multinational corporations, source-based taxation
seems generally preferable. First, the grounds for taxing individuals on
a residence basis do not apply to corporations. The residence of
corporations is difficult to establish and relatively meaningless.
Residence based on place of incorporation is formalistic and subject to
the control of the taxpayer, while residence based on management
and control also can be manipulated. Moreover, multinationals are not
part of a single society and their income does not belong to any
particular society for distributive purposes. Finally, multinationals can
exert significant political influence in jurisdictions other than the
residence jurisdiction of their parent company, and therefore the
concern about taxing foreigners who lack the ability to vote is less
applicable to them.

Second, source-based taxation is consistent with a benefits
perspective on justifying tax jurisdiction. Source jurisdictions provide
significant benefits to corporations that carry on business activities
within them. Such benefits include the provision of infrastructure or
education, as well as more specific government policies such as
keeping the exchange rate stable or interest rates low. These benefits
justify source-based corporate taxation in the sense that the host
country's government bears some of the costs of providing the
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benefits that are necessary for earning the income. As T.S. Adams
wrote in 1917, "A large part of the cost of government is traceable to
the necessity of maintaining a suitable business environment." These
costs justify imposing a tax as compensation to the government
bearing them.

On a more pragmatic level, as Adams also observed, since the
source jurisdiction has by definition the "first bite at the apple," that is,
it has the first opportunity to collect the tax on payments derived from
within its borders, it would be extremely difficult to prevent source
jurisdictions from imposing the tax. "Every state insists upon taxing
the non-resident alien who derives income from source [sic] within
that country, and rightly so, at least inevitably so." Thus, as Michael
Graetz and Michael O’Hear observe, even if economists tend to prefer
pure residence-based taxation, this recommendation is unlikely to be
followed in practice (Graetz and O’Hear, 1997). This is particularly the
case for business income derived from large markets, in which case
there is little fear that the foreign investor will abandon the market
because of source-based taxation. For portfolio investment, however,
even large source countries like the United States have tended to
abandon it for fear of driving away mobile capital. Thus, business
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income is a better candidate for source-based taxation than
investment income.

The division between active (mostly corporate) and passive (mostly
individual) income also makes sense because it is congruent with the
Single Tax Principle, since most of the rate divergence among taxing
jurisdictions arises in the individual income tax, while corporate tax
rates have tended to converge. The top marginal personal income tax
rate among OECD member countries varied in 2006 from 7.5%
(Switzerland) to 53.8% (Germany). This variability is acceptable for
purposes of the Single Tax Principle, because under the Benefits
Principle most income earned by individuals in cross-border
transactions is investment income that generally is subject only to
residence country tax. Therefore, the residence country rate typically
determines the single tax rate for investment income.

Corporate tax rates, on the other hand, do not vary so widely (and
also tend to be flat, rather than progressive). Among OECD member
countries, in 2006 the corporate tax rate ranged from 8.5%
(Switzerland) to 35% (United States), but 22 out of 30 member
countries had rates in the 25% to 35% range. Thus, for purposes of
the Single Tax Principle, the rate applied is generally the residence
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rate for individual (mostly investment) income and a rate in the 2535% range for corporate (mostly business) income. It is congruent
with both the Single Tax and Benefits Principles, however, to have
residual taxation by residence or source jurisdictions in cases where
the jurisdiction that has the primary right to tax under the Benefits
Principle refrains from doing so. Thus, under the Single Tax and
Benefits Principles, all income from cross-border taxation under
current rate structures should be taxed at a rate between
approximately 25% (the lower end of the source rates) and
approximately 55% (the higher end of the residence rates).

Neither the Single Tax Principle nor the Benefits Principle provides a
clear answer to the question of how to divide the corporate income tax
base among the various jurisdictions providing benefits. Market prices
can provide an answer when transactions are at arm's length, but not
when they are between related parties (and there are no comparable
arm's length transactions). In addition, the Single Tax Principle
requires that taxation be imposed even on income derived from a
jurisdiction that chooses not to levy a tax in return for the benefits it
provides. These issues will be addressed further below.

25
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It is useful to summarize the resulting structure of international
taxation in the following table, which divides the world into two
categories of taxpayers, resident and non-resident. For each category,
there is a further division between active (business) and passive
(investment) income. Active income is taxed primarily at source, while
passive income is taxed primarily at residence:

Table 1: The Structure of the International Tax Regime
WORLD
Residents

Non-residents

Active

Passive

Active

Passive

Low tax

High tax

High Tax

Low tax

4. Current Challenges to the International Tax Regime.

In parts 1-3 above, I laid out the thesis that an international tax
regime exists and that it has a coherent structure based on two
principles: the single tax principle (that all income should be subject to
tax once, not twice or more and not less than once) and the benefits
principle (that active income should be taxed primarily at source while
passive income should be taxed primarily at residence).
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While the benefits principle is broadly accepted as reflecting the
consensus compromise reached under the auspices of the League of
Nations in the 1920s (see Ault 1991, Graetz & O'Hear 1996), there is a
debate on whether there exists an international tax regime (see
Rosenbloom 2000, 2006) and in particular whether it incorporates a
single tax principle (see Rosenbloom 2006). Whether preventing
double non-taxation is an appropriate goal of international tax has
been hotly debated, e.g., in the 2004 Vienna Congress of the
International Fiscal Association.
In this concluding part, I will survey three relatively recent
developments that undermine the single tax principle: tax competition
for passive income, tax competition for active income, and tax
arbitrage. I will then discuss various reactions to these developments
at both the national and supra-national levels (primarily through the
OECD), and assess their success in curbing the threat to the single tax
principle. Finally, I will discuss the implications of these reactions for
the debate surrounding the existence of the international tax regime.
In my opinion, these reactions prove that an increasing number of
important tax administrations, as well as the OECD, believe in the
single tax principle and seek to implement it in practice.

a. Tax Competition for Passive Investment.
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Since the United States unilaterally abolished withholding on
portfolio interest in 1984, there has been a distinct trend not to tax
interest at source, which has spread to other forms of passive income
such as capital gains, royalties, rents, and even dividends. I have
explained elsewhere (Avi-Yonah, 1996) why a combination of officially
sanctioned loopholes (such as the portfolio interest exemption), source
rules (such as the rules for capital gains and for payments under
derivative financial instruments), and treaty reductions have led to the
United States not applying its withholding tax to almost all forms of
passive investment income that economically derive from the US
market.
The lack of withholding tax combines with the existence of tax
havens to make it almost impossible for residence countries to
effectively tax passive income. In the absence of withholding tax,
source countries have no interest in collecting information on
payments of such income to non-residents. Tax havens have bank
secrecy laws, and payments can be made to them from source country
without any information collected that can be exchanged with the
residence country under article 26 of the treaties.
The result is widespread double non-taxation of investment
income: no withholding at source, and no effective residence taxation
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because of no effective exchange of information. It is hard to estimate
how much tax is evaded in this way, but Vito Tanzi has estimated that
as much as $7 trillion in interest income escape taxation (Tanzi,
1996). For the US, there is an estimate of an annual revenue loss of
$50 billion due to this type of evasion (Guttentag and Avi-Yonah,
2005).
However, since 1998 there have been a series of steps taken by
residence countries to combat this phenomenon. This is reflected in
steps taken at the OECD, the EU, and by national tax administrations.
The OECD has addressed the problem of tax havens in its 1998 report
on harmful tax competition and has exerted significant pressure on tax
havens to allow effective exchange of information. It has also adopted
a new, much stronger version of art. 26 in its model treaty, and has
drafted a multilateral exchange of information treaty. The EU has
adopted the savings directive, which requires member states to
cooperate in ensuring that payments of interest and other forms of
passive income from one member state to another be subject to either
withholding or information reporting. And national tax administrations
have

concluded

exchange

of

information

agreements

with

an

expanding number of tax havens. The US, for example, has such
agreements with most of the Caribbean jurisdictions listed as tax
havens by the OECD. The US is also cooperating in exchange of
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information with the EU by forcing financial institutions to collect
information on payments to the EU that are covered by the portfolio
interest exemption. Even Switzerland has agreed to cooperate and
relax its strict bank secrecy laws.
I have expressed some doubts about whether these initiatives
are working. In particular, the actual agreements reached with tax
havens tend to fall short of the expanded version of article 26
envisaged by the OECD. We still lack universal tax ID numbers to help
tax administrations use the information that they get. And even one
non-cooperating tax haven can defeat the whole effort if payments can
be routed through it. That is why I still believe that a better solution is
a coordinated withholding tax imposed by the OECD members (US, EU
and Japan), and refundable upon a showing that the income has been
declared to the residence country. After all, nobody can afford to leave
their funds in tax havens; they must be invested in the OECD
countries to earn a decent rate of return.
However, the key point here is not whether the effort is
succeeding, but that it is made. In my opinion, it is clear that in the
view of all 30 members of the OECD (as well as all 25 members of the
EU, which largely overlap with the OECD), the single tax principle is
valid, and double non-taxation of passive income is not acceptable.
Otherwise, they would not have reacted to the collapse of source-
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based taxation of such income after 1984 by trying so hard to tax it on
a residence basis (where, in accordance with the benefits principle, it
should be taxed).

b. Tax Competition for Active Investment.

As I have explained at length elsewhere (Avi-Yonah, 2000), tax
competition for FDI has been growing steadily since about 1980 and
now means that multinationals can hope to escape any tax on their
cross-border income. Suppose a multinational is resident in country A,
has its production facilities in country B, and sells its products in
country C. Country C can only tax the MNE if it has a permanent
establishment therein, and in the age of electronic commerce, that
may be possible to avoid. Country B typically does not tax the MNE
because it is a "production tax haven," i.e., a country that refrains
from taxing production activities by MNEs while imposing a general
corporate tax on domestic corporations. Country A also typically would
not tax the resident MNE on a current basis because it is afraid of MNE
headquarters migrating to other countries (either by inversion type
transactions or by takeover by foreign MNEs) and of new MNEs being
incorporated elsewhere. As a result, a MNE like Intel ends up paying
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no tax at all on its foreign source income (and if it can deduct stock
options, also on its US source income).
The economic data show that this type of tax competition exists,
although it tends to affect more the corporate tax revenues in
developing countries (country B in the example) than the developed
country (countries A and C) (Keen and Simone, 2004). The reason is
that OECD countries have been reducing the PE threshold (LeGall,
2006) and that it turns our that for most MNEs it is hard to avoid
having a PE even in the age of e-commerce (Avi-Yonah, 1997 and
2001).
However, in this case also the OECD has been working hard to
combat the tax competition phenomenon by putting pressure on both
OECD members and non-members to abolish the production tax
havens, as well as to abandon tax sparing rules in treaties that foster
double non-taxation. In addition, the WTO has been pressuring
developing countries to abandon production tax havens that amount to
export subsidies, and many Latin American countries have in fact
abandoned their production tax haven regimes in the Doha Round.
Finally, countries have been taking steps to defend residence-based
taxation of their MNEs by adopting or strengthening CFC rules (26
countries now have such rules, which were pioneered by the US in
1962) and combating inversion transactions (e.g., IRC 7874).
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Again, the main point is not whether these efforts have been
successful, although at least for OECD members they seem to have
stopped the erosion of the corporate tax base that was evident in the
1990s. The main point is that by adopting such measures, OECD
members (as well as the WTO) show that they do not believe in double
non-taxation of active income and are trying to protect the taxation of
such income at source (with residual taxation by the residence country
if there is no taxation at source). I believe this trend will continue until
effective residence-based taxation by OECD members stops developing
countries from engaging in harmful tax competition.

c. Tax Arbitrage.

Tax arbitrage can be defined as transactions that are designed to
take advantage of differences between national tax systems to achieve
double non-taxation. Thus, tax arbitrage directly negates the single
tax principle.
There is no question that Rosenbloom is correct in his assertion
that countries did not always care about tax arbitrage. The first US tax
treaty was with France in 1937, when France was purely territorial, so
the US reduced its tax at source in the knowledge that the income will
not be taxed at residence.
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But I believe that developments since 1984 show that the US as
well as other OECD member countries have reached a consensus that
rejects tax arbitrage. In 1984, the US terminated its treaty with the
Netherlands Antilles on the ground that it should not have treaties with
countries that do not tax on a residence basis. Since then, it has been
clear that the US will not enter into treaties with tax havens, and that
it views reductions in source-based taxation as premised upon the
income being taxed by the state of residence. That is why the US
insists since 1986 on limitation on benefits rules in all its tax treaties,
which are designed to prevent reductions in source taxation benefiting
non-treaty

country

residents

precisely

because

such

non-treaty

residents may not be taxable on a residence basis. Domestically, this
rule has been bolstered by court cases and by regulations against the
use of conduits to achieve treaty benefits. It has also been adopted by
the OECD through changes to the commentary to art. 1 of the OECD
model.
The negative attitude of the US to tax arbitrage and double nontaxation is also evident outside the treaty context. Also in 1984, the
US adopted the dual consolidated loss rule, which is designed to
prevent a taxpayer from using one economic loss in two taxing
jurisdictions. As Rosenbloom (2000) admits, this rule (which has
recently been expanded in regulations) makes no sense unless the US
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believes that double non-taxation is bad. In the 1990s, the US took a
series of steps to combat specific tax arbitrage transactions based on
check the box, such as IRS section 894© (the reverse hybrid rule) and
Notices 98-5 and 98-11. While the specific notices were later
withdrawn, the Bush administration continues to fight tax arbitrage, as
evidenced by recent regulations on tax arbitrage transactions involving
the foreign tax credit (Reich, 2006, Peaslee 2006).
The same negative view toward tax arbitrage can be seen in
other countries. A recent article in the International Tax Review (2006)
lists new anti-tax arbitrage rules being adopted recently in Australia,
Canada, Japan, the UK, and even Ireland (with a corporate tax rate of
only 12.5%) has adopted such rules in 2006. The UK rules are
particularly comprehensive and have drawn bitter complaints from tax
practitioners, to no avail.
Rosenbloom (2006) writes that although an international tax
regime may exist, and although tax treaties can be regarded as a
"closed" system that condition reductions in source taxation on
taxation by the residence country, the single tax principle is still a
mirage: "At the level of specific rules, however, there is no mechanism
for enforcing, or even attempting to enforce, either the benefits
principle or the single tax principle… At the level of individual

35
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007

35

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 67 [2007]

transactions, in fact, it is hard to discern the existence of any
international tax regime at all."
Rosenbloom

may

be

right

about

that-

as

a

practitioner

specializing in tax arbitrage transactions, he should know. But at the
policy level, I disagree with his view that "an effort to foreclose crossborder arbitrage opportunities is not and should not be a first-rank
policy objective of the United States." We can argue about that "should
not", and that is the point of the earlier debate we had on this topic
(Rosenbloom 2000, Avi-Yonah 2000). But in face of the accumulating
evidence to the contrary, it seems to me hard to argue about the "is
not": Both the US, and other OECD member countries, are in fact
concerned about tax arbitrage and by extension about double nontaxation, both in the treaty context and outside it.

d. Conclusion.
This article has attempted to describe the contours of the
international tax regime. I have tried to show that such a regime
exists and that it is based on the single tax and benefits principles.
Moreover, I believe the regime, both through treaties and through
actual practice, can be regarded as part of customary international
law. Whether or not that last conclusion is valid, it is hard to argue
with the proposition that all countries, even the United States, face
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significant practical difficulties in attempting to depart from the
international tax regime.
If the above is true, I believe that we can do better. In
particular, it would help if countries explicitly articulated that they are
trying to adhere to the single tax and benefits principle, and take
those principles into account in drafting their tax laws. Moreover, the
OECD should take these principles more explicitly into consideration in
revising its model treaty, and revise the model so that it functions
better to prevent both double taxation and double non-taxation. But
that is a topic for another day (Avi-Yonah, Schoen and Vann,
forthcoming).

37
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007

37

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 67 [2007]

REFERENCES

Ault, 1992. Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the
Division of the International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 Tax
L. Rev. 565.
Ault, 2001. Hugh J. Ault, The Importance of International Cooperation
in Forging Tax Policy, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1693.
Avi-Yonah 1995. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's
Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15
Virginia Tax Rev. 89.
Avi-Yonah 1996a. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International
Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Texas L. Rev. 1301.
Avi-Yonah 1997. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of
Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. Rev. 507.
Avi-Yonah 2000a. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax
Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 1573.
Avi-Yonah 2000b. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment on Rosenbloom,
International Tax Arbitrage and the "International Tax System", 53
Tax L. Rev. 167.
Avi-Yonah 2001. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition and ECommerce, 23 Tax Notes Int’l 1395.
Avi-Yonah 2002. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency,
Equity, and Progressive Taxation (Review of Slemrod, Does Atlas
Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich), 111 Yale L J
1391.
Avi-Yonah 2004a. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the
State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193.
Avi-Yonah 2004b. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as
International Law, 57 Tax L. Rev. 483.
Avi-Yonah, Schoen and Vann, forthcoming. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Wolfgang Scoen and Richard Vann, The Treatment of Business Profits
Under Tax Treaties.
Dagan, 2000. Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 NYU J. Int’l L. &
Pol. 939.
dell'Anese, 2006. Luca dell’Anese, Tax Arbitrage and the Changing
Structure of International Tax Law.
Graetz, 2001. Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies,
26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1357.
Graetz and O’Hear 1997. Michael J. Graetz and Michael M. O’Hear, The
“Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 Duke L.J. 1021.

38
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art67

38

Avi-Yonah:

Guttentag and Avi-Yonah, 2005. Joseph Guttentag and Reuven AviYonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in Max B. Sawicky (ed.),
Bridging the Tax Gap: Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax
Administration, 99.
International Tax Review 2006. Keeping Clear of the Rules.
Kane, 2005. Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in National
Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 Emory L.J. 89.
Keen and Simone, 2004. Michael Keen and Alejandro Simone, Is Tax
Competition Harming Developing Countries More Than Developed, 34
Tax Notes Int’l 1317.
Leppard, 1999. Is the United States Obligated to Drive on the Right,
10 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 43.
McDaniel, 2001. Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 Brook. J.
Int’l L. 1621.
Menuchin 2004. Shay N. Menuchin, The Dilemma of International Tax
Arbitrage.
Peaslee 2006. James M. Peaslee, Creditable Taxes as an Expense in
Applying the Economic Profit Test- Here We Go Again?
Reich 2006. Yaron Z. Reich, International Arbitrage Transactions
Involving Creditable Taxes. Taxes, forthcoming.
Ring 2005. Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy
Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C.L. Rev. 79.
Roin, 2001. Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective
on International Tax Competition, 89 Geo. L.J. 543.
Rosenbloom, 2000. H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage
and the "International Tax System", 53 Tax L. Rev. 137.
Rosenbloom, 2006. H. David Rosenbloom, CROSS-BORDER ARBITRAGE:
THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY, TAXES (FORTHCOMING).
Tanzi, 1995. Taxation in an Integrating World.
Vann, 2000. Richard J. Vann, International Aspects of Income Tax, in 2
Tax Law Design and Drafting 728 (Victor Thuronyi, ed.)
West, 1996. Philip R. West, Foreign Law in U.S. International Taxation,
3 Fla. Tax Rev. 147.

39
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007

39

